We focus on decomposition of fault-tolerant real-time programs that are designed from their fault-intolerant versions.
Contributions of the paper. In this paper, we concentrate on the necessity of state predicate detection and state predicate correction within a pre-specified bounded amount of time. That is, we show that every fault-tolerant real-time program that reuses its fault-intolerant version must contain detectors or (weak/strong) δ-correctors. The main results from this paper are as follows:
• We precisely define what it means for a fault-tolerant real-time program to contain a component. Our definition of containment for (weak/strong) δ-correctors is similar to that in [1] . However, for detectors, our definition of containment is more rigorous than that in [1] in that it precisely identifies how predicates being detected are related to the faultintolerant program and how the output of the detector (called witness predicate) is being used by the fault-tolerant program.
• A nonmasking fault-tolerant program with recovery time θ is one that recovers to a state from where its subsequent computation satisfies both (timed and untimed) safety and liveness within θ time units. However, safety may be violated before the program reaches such a state. We show that if a program satisfies both the safety and the liveness specifications within θ, then there exists δ, where δ is a function of θ, such that the program contains strong δ-correctors.
• A hard-failsafe fault-tolerant program is one that always satisfies both untimed and timed parts of its safety specification.
Regarding hard-failsafe fault-tolerance, we show that hard-failsafe fault-tolerant programs contain detectors to satisfy the untimed part and weak δ-correctors to satisfy the timed part of their safety specification for some δ.
• A soft-masking fault-tolerant program with recovery time θ is one that recovers to a state from where its subsequent computation satisfies both safety and liveness within θ time units. Moreover, until such a state is reached, only the untimed part of its safety specification is not violated. We show that soft-masking fault-tolerant programs contain detectors and strong δ-correctors for some δ, where δ is a function of θ.
• A hard-masking fault-tolerant program with recovery time θ is a soft-masking program with recovery time θ that satisfies both untimed and timed parts of its safety specification during recovery. We show that hard-masking fault-tolerant programs contain detectors, weak δ 1 -correctors, and strong δ 2 -correctors for some δ 1 and δ 2 , where δ 2 is a function of θ.
Organization of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we formally define the notions of realtime programs, faults, and fault-tolerance. Then, in Section 3, we present the formal definition of fault-tolerance components for real-time programs, namely, detectors and weak/strong δ-correctors. In Section 4, we develop the theory of the components and we show the necessity of their existence in real-time programs with respect to different levels of fault-tolerance. Finally, in Section 5, we make concluding remarks and discuss future work.
Real-Time Programs, Specifications, and Fault-Tolerance
In this section, we give formal definitions of real-time programs, specifications, faults, and fault-tolerance. The definition of real programs is adapted from Alur and Henzinger [4] and Alur and Dill [5] . The definition of specifications is based on the work by Alpern and Schneider [2] and Henzinger [3] . Finally, the notion of faults and fault-tolerance is due to Arora and Gouda [6] , and Bonakdarpour and Kulkarni [7] .
Real-Time Programs
Let V be a finite set of discrete variables and W be a finite set of clock variables. Each discrete variable is associated with a finite domain D of values. A location is a function that maps each discrete variable to a value from its respective domain. A clock constraint over the set W of clock variables is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form x c or x − y c, where x, y ∈ W , c ∈ Z ≥0 , and is either < or ≤. We denote the set of all clock constraints over W by Φ(W ). A clock valuation is a function ν : W → R ≥0 that assigns a real value to each clock variable. Furthermore, for τ ∈ R ≥0 , ν + τ = ν(x) + τ for every clock x. Also, for λ ⊆ W , ν[λ := 0] denotes the clock valuation for W which assigns 0 to each x ∈ λ and agrees with ν over the rest of the clock variables in W .
A state (denoted σ) is a pair s, ν , such that s is a location and ν is a clock valuation for W at location s. The set of all possible states is called the state space obtained from the associated variables.
Definition 2.1 (computations)
A computation is a finite or infinite timed state sequence of the form:
where σ i is a state in the state space obtained from the associated variables, for all i ∈ Z ≥0 , and the sequence τ 0 τ 1 τ 2 · · · (called global time) satisfies the following constraints:
• Initialization: τ 0 ≥ 0,
• Monotonicity: τ i ≤ τ i+1 for all i ∈ Z ≥0 , and
• Divergence: if σ is infinite, for all t ∈ R ≥0 , there exists j such that τ j ≥ t.
Notice that in Definition 2.1, we do not specify an initial value for global time. It follows that in a computation σ, τ 0 can be assigned any value from R ≥0 . Let σ + t denote the computation with time shift t ∈ R, such that τ 0 ≥ 0 (i.e., τ i becomes τ i + t for all i ≥ 0). Also, let Σ be any set of computations. For all σ ∈ Σ, we require that for all time shifts t ∈ R, σ + t be in Σ as well.
Definition 2.2 (suffix and fusion closure)
Suffix closure of a set of computations means that if a computation σ is in that set then so are all the suffixes of σ. Fusion closure of a set of computations means that if computations α, (σ, τ ), γ and β, (σ, τ ), ψ are in that set then so are the computations α, (σ, τ ), ψ and β, (σ, τ ), γ , where α and β are finite prefixes of computations, γ and ψ are suffixes of computations, and σ is a state at global time τ .
Notation.
Let σ i denote the pair (σ i , τ i ) in computation σ. Also, let α and β be finite computations, where the length of α is n. The concatenation of α and β (denoted αβ) is a computation, where either clock variables (except possibly a subset that is reset) and global time of α n−1 and β 0 are equal, but their locations are different, or their locations are equal, but the clock variables and global time are advanced equally. If Γ and Ψ are two sets of finite computations, then ΓΨ = {αβ : α ∈ Γ and β ∈ Ψ }.
Definition 2.3 (real-time programs)
A real-time program p is specified by a set of discrete variables, a set of clock variables, and a suffix closed and fusion closed set of maximal computations in the state space of p (denoted S p ). By maximal, we mean
then there is no other computation of p that has a prefix of α. In other words, given a finite computation prefix α of p, p does not contain the computation that stutters σ n+1 infinitely if there is any other computation of p that extends α.
Notation. For simplicity, we use the pseudo-arithmetic expressions to denote timing constraints over finite computations.
For instance, σ ≤δ , where δ ∈ Z ≥0 , denotes a finite computation (σ 0 , τ 0 ) → (σ 1 , τ 1 ) → · · · (σ n , τ n ) that satisfies the timing constraint τ n − τ 0 ≤ δ.
Definition 2.4 (state predicates)
A state predicate of p is a subset of S p . We say that a state predicate S is closed in p iff in
for all states σ k , where k ≥ j (i.e., σ k |= S). Definition 2.5 (S-computations) Let S be a state predicate and p be a program. The S-computations of p, denoted as p | S, is the set of computations of p that start in a state where S is true.
Notice that since the set of computations of a program is suffix closed and fusion closed, the program can be written in terms of transitions that it can execute [1] . Hence, we can view a program p as a set of transitions. To concisely write the transitions of a program, we use timed guarded commands [4] . A timed guarded command (also called timed actions) is of the form L :: Guard λ − → statement, where L is a label, Guard is a state predicate, statement is a statement that describes how the program state is updated, and λ is a set of clock variables that are reset by execution of L. Thus, L denotes the set of transitions {(σ 0 , σ 1 ) | Guard is true in state σ 0 , σ 1 is obtained by resetting the clock variables in λ and changing σ 0 as prescribed by statement}. A guarded wait command (also called delay action) is of the form Guard −→ wait, where Guard identifies the states where a delay transition is allowed to be taken (i.e., the program stutters in a location and lets time advance). A guarded wait command delays the program by an arbitrary amount of time, as long as Guard remains true. We present examples of timed guarded commands in Section 4.
Specifications
Similar to a program, a specification (also called property) is specified by sets of discrete and clock variables (respectively, state space) and a suffix closed and fusion closed set of (finite or infinite) computations over the state space obtained from those variables.
In order to capture the real-time properties of programs (e.g., deadlines and recovery time), in this paper, we focus on a standard property of real-time systems called stable bounded response. Definition 2.6 (stable bounded response) Let P and Q be two state predicates. A stable bounded response property (denoted P → ≤δ Q) is the set of all computations (σ 0 , τ 0 ) → (σ 1 , τ 1 ) → · · · in which if σ i |= P , for some i ≥ 0, then there exists j, j ≥ i, such that (1) σ j |= Q, (2) τ j − τ i ≤ δ, and (3) for all k, i ≤ k < j, σ k |= P . In other words, it is always the case that a state in P is followed by a state in Q within δ time units and P continuously remains true until Q becomes true. We call P the event predicate, Q the response predicate, and δ the response time.
Assumption 2.7
We assume that the set of clock variables of any stable bounded response property P → ≤δ Q contains a special clock variable, which is reset whenever P becomes true. This assumption is necessary to ensure that stable bounded response properties are fusion closed.
The specifications considered in this paper (denoted SPEC ) are an intersection of the safety specification and the liveness specification, defined next. Definition 2.8 (safety specification) We define the safety specification by a set of computations based on (1) a set SPEC bt of instantaneous bad transitions of the form s 0 , ν → s 1 , ν[λ := 0] where s 0 and s 1 are two locations and λ is a set of clock variables, and (2) a set SPEC br of m bounded response properties of the form (
for some m, m ≥ 1. Precisely, the safety specification is the intersection of the following sets:
1. the set of computations where no prefix contains a transition in SPEC bt , and 2. the intersection of sets of computations corresponding to each stable bounded response property
Notation. With abuse of notation for simplicity, throughout the paper, whenever we refer to SPEC bt , we mean the corresponding set of computations that do not contain a transition in SPEC bt . Definition 2.9 (liveness specification) A liveness specification is a set of computations that meets the following condition:
for each finite computation α there exists a computation β such that αβ is in that set.
Notation. We use S * to denote a finite computation (σ 0 , τ 0 ) → (σ 1 , τ 1 ) → · · · (σ n , τ n ) such that σ i |= S for all i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, (true) * denotes an arbitrary finite computation. Now, we define what it means for program p to refine a specification SPEC , and what it means for program p (typically, a fault-tolerant program) to refine program p (typically, a fault-intolerant program). Essentially, we would like to define 'p refines p' iff computations of p are a subset of that in p. However, if p is obtained by adding fault-tolerance to p then p may contain additional variables that are not in p. Hence, it will be necessary to project the computations of p on (the variables of) p and then check if the projected computation is a computation of p. More precisely, the projection of a state of p on p (respectively, SPEC ) is a state obtained by considering only the (discrete and clock) variables of p (respectively, SPEC ).
Extending this definition for computations, we say that the projection of a computation of p on p (respectively, SPEC ) is a computation obtained by projecting each state in that computation on p (respectively, SPEC ). Definition 2.10 (refines) We say that p refines p (respectively, SPEC ) from S iff the following two conditions hold: (1) S is closed in p , and (2) For every computation of p that starts in a state where S is true, the projection of that computation on p (respectively, SPEC ) is a computation of p (respectively, SPEC ).
We also define the notion of maintains for finite computations. Specifically, given a finite prefix α, α maintains SPEC captures that the specification is not yet violated in α. Definition 2.11 (maintains) Let α be a prefix of a computation of p. We say that α maintains SPEC iff there exists a computation β such that the projection of αβ on SPEC is in SPEC .
Informally speaking, proving the correctness of p with respect to SPEC involves showing that p refines SPEC from some state predicate S, where S = {}. We call such a state predicate S an invariant of p. Definition 2.12 (invariant) Let S be a state predicate. We say that S is an invariant of p for SPEC iff p refines SPEC from S and S = {}.
Faults and Fault-Tolerance in Real-Time Programs
Intuitively, the faults that a program is subject to are systematically represented by the union of transitions whose execution perturbs the program state and transitions that unexpectedly advance time. While state corruption faults may indirectly cause waste of time, delay faults directly cause waste of time in the sense that they defer the occurrence of some desirable event by some amount of time. For instance, a processor crash may require a scheduler to assign another processor to a set of jobs. It is natural, to model the delay in start time of such jobs by delay faults that only advance the value of clock variables. Formally, we model faults as a set of transitions over (discrete and clock) variables of p. We now define what we mean by computations of a program in the presence of faults. Given a program p and faults f , we define the computations of p in the presence of f by finite fusion-closure of the computations of p ∪ f as follows.
Let Z be a set of computations and • be the operator that fuses two (finite or infinite) computations of Z such that
we define the computations of p in the presence of
Assumption 2.14 Observe that the above formulation of program computations in the presence of faults guarantees that the number of occurrence of faults in a computation is finite. In this paper, however, since we deal with real-time programs and our goal is to identify components that provide "bounded-time" recovery in the presence of faults, we assume that the number of occurrence of faults in all computations is bounded by some number k ∈ Z ≥0 . This assumption is reasonable in many commonly considered fault-tolerant real-time programs. In fact, it can be shown that providing bounded-time recovery in the presence of unbounded number of faults is not possible.
Just as we use invariants to show program correctness in the absence of faults, we use fault-spans to show the correctness of programs in the presence of faults.
Definition 2.15 (fault-span) Let S and T be state predicates and f be a set of fault transitions. We say that T is an f -span of
Notation. Henceforth, if the specification or projection of a program on SPEC is clear from the context, we omit it. For example, "S is an invariant of p" abbreviates "S is an invariant of p for SPEC ". Likewise, "a computation of p is in SPEC "
abbreviates "the projection of that computation on SPEC is in SPEC ". Similarly, "T is an f -span of p" abbreviates "T is an f -span of p from S".
We now define what we mean by levels of fault-tolerance in the context of real-time programs. Obviously, in the absence of faults, a program should refine its specification. In the presence of faults, however, it may not refine its specification and, hence, it may refine some (possibly) weaker 'tolerance specification'. These specifications are based on satisfaction of a combinations of safety, liveness, timing constraints, and a desirable bounded-time recovery mechanism in the presence of faults. Intuitively, we consider three levels of fault-tolerance, namely failsafe, nonmasking, and masking, based on satisfaction of safety and liveness properties in the presence of faults. For failsafe and masking fault-tolerance, we, furthermore, consider two additional levels, namely soft and hard, based on satisfaction of timing constraints in the presence of faults. Moreover, nonmasking and masking fault-tolerant programs are associated with a required recovery time, which can be bounded or unbounded.
To motivate the idea of soft and hard fault-tolerance, let us consider the railroad crossing problem. Suppose that a train is approaching a railroad crossing. The safety specification requires that "if the train is crossing, the gate must be closed". Also, a stable bounded response property requires that "once the gate is closed, it should reopen within 5 minutes". In this example, it may be catastrophic if the train is crossing while the gate is open due to occurrence of faults. On the other hand, if the gate remains closed for more than 5 minutes due to occurrence of faults, the outcome is not disastrous. Thus, depending upon the outcome of violation of a safety specification, the desired level of fault-tolerance changes. Hence, in the railroad crossing problem the system must tolerate faults that cause the gate to remain open while the train is crossing. We call such a system soft fault-tolerant. Intuitively, a soft fault-tolerant real-time program is not required to satisfy its timing constraints in the presence of faults. Now, consider a system that controls internal pressure of a boiler. Suppose that in this system, the safety specification requires that once a pressure gauge reads 30 pounds per square inch, the controller must issue a command to open a valve within 20 seconds. In such a system, if occurrence of faults causes the controller not to respond within the required time, the outcome may be disastrous. Thus, our boiler controller must satisfy its timing constraints even in the presence of faults. In other words, the boiler controller must be hard fault-tolerant. Intuitively, a hard fault-tolerant real-time program must satisfy its timing constraints even in the presence of faults. In fact, in hard fault-tolerant programs, the demand for hard real-time processing merges with catastrophic consequences of systems, whereas in soft fault-tolerance the catastrophic consequences are not related to the program's timing constraints.
Below, we define tolerance specifications that often occur in practice. Let SPEC be the specification obtained by the intersection of SPEC bt , SPEC br , and liveness specification as defined in Subsection 2.2.
Definition 2.16 (soft and hard-failsafe tolerance specification)
The soft-failsafe tolerance specification of SPEC is the smallest safety specification containing SPEC bt (denoted SSPEC bt ). The hard-failsafe tolerance specification of SPEC is the intersection of SSPEC bt and the smallest specification containing SPEC br (denoted SSPEC br ). I.e, The hard-failsafe tolerance specification of SPEC is SSPEC bt ∩ SSPEC br . Remark. Notice that the hard-masking tolerance specification is independent of the recovery time θ. This is because unlike nonmasking and soft-masking, in hard-masking fault-tolerance the entire specification (i.e., SPEC ) must always be satisfied and, hence, recovery time becomes only a matter of the amount of time that the program is in states outside its invariant.
Using these definitions, we are now ready to define what it means for a program to tolerate a fault-class f . With the intuition that a program is f -tolerant to SPEC if it refines SPEC in the absence of faults and it refines a tolerance specification of SPEC in the presence of f , we define 'f -tolerant to SPEC from S' as follows.
Definition 2.19 (fault-tolerant programs)
We say that p is soft/hard-failsafe f -tolerant to SPEC from S (respectively, nonmasking or soft/hard-masking f -tolerant to SPEC with recovery time θ from S) iff the following two conditions hold:
• p refines SPEC from S, and
• there exists T such that T ⊇ S and p[]f refines the soft/hard-failsafe tolerance specification of SPEC from T (respectively, the nonmasking or soft/hard-masking tolerance specification of SPEC with recovery time θ from T ).
Note that for nonmasking and masking levels of fault-tolerance one can choose to have unbounded-time recovery. We address the effect of the choice of recovery time in Section 4.
Notation. In the sequel, whenever the specification SPEC and the invariant S are clear from the context, we omit them; thus, "nonmasking f -tolerant with recovery time θ" abbreviates "nonmasking f -tolerant to SPEC with recovery time θ from S", and so on.
Real-Time Fault-Tolerance Components
In this section, we present real-time fault-tolerance components, namely, detectors, weak δ-correctors, and strong δ-correctors.
Once we define these components, in Section 4, we present the relevance of each component to the levels of fault-tolerance introduced in Subsection 2.3.
Detectors
In this subsection, we formally introduce the first of the three tolerance components, detectors. We will develop their theory and present a simple altitude switch example to illustrate an instance of detectors in Subsection 4.2.
Definition 3.1 (detects) Let X and Z be state predicates. Let 'Z detects X' be the specification, that is the set of all computations σ = (σ 0 , τ 0 ) → (σ 1 , τ 1 ) → · · · , satisfying the following three conditions:
• (Stability) There exists i, i ≥ 0, such that for all j, j ≥ i, if σ j |= Z then σ j+1 |= Z or σ j+1 |= X.
A detector d is used to check whether its "detection predicate", X, is true. Since d satisfies Progress from U , in any computation in d, if U ∧ X is true continuously, d eventually detects this fact and makes Z true. Since d satisfies Safeness from U , it follows that d never lets Z witness X incorrectly. Moreover, since d satisfies Stability from U , it follows that once Z becomes true, it continues to be true unless X is falsified.
Definition 3.3 (tolerant detector) d is a soft/hard-failsafe (respectively, nonmasking or soft/hard-masking) tolerant detector
(respectively, with recovery time θ) to 'Z detects X' from U iff d refines the soft/hard-failsafe (respectively, nonmasking or soft/hard-masking) tolerance specification of 'Z detects X' (respectively, with recovery time θ) from U .
δ-Correctors
In this subsection, we formally introduce the second of the two tolerance components, δ-correctors. We will develop their theory and present examples to illustrate an instance of δ-correctors in subsections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
Definition 3.4 (weakly corrects)
Let X and Z be state predicates. Let 'Z weakly corrects X within δ' be the specification, that is the set of all computations σ = (σ 0 , τ 0 ) → (σ 1 , τ 1 ) → · · · , satisfying the following conditions:
•
• (Stability) There exists i, i ≥ 0, such that for all j,
Definition 3.5 (weak δ-corrector) Z weekly corrects X within δ in c from U iff c refines 'Z weakly corrects X within δ' from U . Definition 3.6 (strongly corrects) Let X and Z be state predicates. Let 'Z strongly corrects X within δ' be the specification, that is the set of all computations σ = (σ 0 , τ 0 ) → (σ 1 , τ 1 ) → · · · , satisfying the following two conditions:
• Z weakly corrects X within δ, and
Definition 3.7 (strong δ-corrector) We say that Z strongly corrects X within δ in c from U iff c refines 'Z strongly corrects X within δ' from U .
Since c satisfies Weak (respectively, Strong) Convergence from U , it follows that c reaches a state where X becomes true within δ time units (and, respectively, X continues to be true thereafter). Moreover, since c satisfies Safeness from U , it follows that a corrector never lets the predicate Z witness the correction predicate X incorrectly. Since c satisfies Progress from U , it follows that eventually Z becomes true. And, finally, since c satisfies Stability from U , it follows that when Z becomes true, Z is never falsified.
Definition 3.8 (tolerant δ-corrector) c is a soft/hard-failsafe (respectively, nonmasking or soft/hard-masking) tolerant weak/strong δ-corrector (respectively, with recovery time θ) to 'Z weakly/strongly corrects X within δ' from U iff c refines the soft/hard-failsafe (respectively, nonmasking or soft/hard-masking) tolerance specification (respectively, with recovery time θ) of 'Z weakly/strongly corrects X within δ' from U .
Remark. If the witness predicate Z is identical to the correction predicate X, our definition of the corrects relation reduces to one given by Arora and Gouda [6] . We have considered this more general definition to accommodate the case -which occurs for instance in soft/hard-masking tolerance-where the witness predicate Z can be checked atomically but the correction predicate X cannot.
The Necessity of Detectors and δ-Correctors in Fault-Tolerant Real-Time Programs
In this section, we develop the theory of detectors and δ-correctors. More specifically, we show the necessity of existence of a combination of these components in different levels of fault-tolerance introduced in Subsection 2.3.
Observe that, in the definition of tolerance specifications in Subsection 2.3, when the required recovery time for nonmasking and soft-masking fault-tolerance is unbounded, the resulting levels of fault-tolerance reduce to the ones addressed by Arora and Kulkarni in [1] . Moreover, since soft-failsafe programs are not required to satisfy their timing constraints in the presence of faults, this level reduces to the one considered in [1] as well. Thus, in the following subsections, out of eight possible levels of fault-tolerance introduced in Subsection 2.3, we only consider the ones that are not addressed in [1] .
The Role of Strong δ-Correctors in Nonmasking Fault-Tolerance
In this subsection, we start developing the theory of strong δ-correctors. Subsequently, we build upon an example to illustrate an instance of δ-correctors. Intuitively, our goal is to show that if a program is nonmasking f -tolerant then it contains nonmasking tolerant strong δ-correctors. We present this result in Theorem 4.4. Throughout this section, let p be a program, SPEC be a specification, and σ be a state.
In order to prove our goal, first, in Claim 4.2, we show that if a program refines a specification within θ time units then it contains strong δ-correctors for some δ. More specifically, let p be a program that refines SPEC from S. In Claim 4.2, we
show that if p is designed such that it behaves like p within θ and, thus, has a suffix in SPEC , then p is a strong δ-corrector
Definition 4.1 (becomes)
We say that p becomes p within θ from T iff p refines (true) * ≤θ p from T .
Claim 4.2 Programs that refine a specification within θ time units contain strong δ-correctors. That is, if
• p refines SPEC from S,
• p refines p from S, and
• p becomes p|S within θ from T then
• there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 such that p is a strong δ-corrector of an invariant predicate of p.
Proof.
Let X = S, and Z = S ∧ {σ | σ is a state of p such that σ is reached in some computation of p starting from T }.
Since p refines SPEC from S, it follows that X is an invariant predicate of p for SPEC . Now, we show that there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 such that p refines 'Z strongly corrects X within δ' from T :
• By definition of Z, in any state where Z is true, S is true. Thus, Safeness is satisfied.
• Since p becomes p|S within θ from T , i.e., p refines (true) * ≤θ (p|S) from T , every computation of p starting from T will reach a state where S is true within θ. By definition of Z, Z is true in this state as well. Thus, Progress is satisfied.
• Since p refines p from S, it follows that S is closed in p . Obviously, the second conjunct in Z is closed in p as well and, thus, Z is closed in p . Moreover, since we are guaranteed that Z is eventually reached in any computation, Stability is satisfied.
• Since p refines (true) * ≤θ (p|S) from T , every computation of p starting from T will reach a state where S is true within θ. Moreover, S(= X) is closed in p . Thus, by choosing δ = θ, Strong Convergence within δ is satisfied. 
Let X = S, and Z = R We show that there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 such that p refines the nonmasking tolerance specification with recovery time θ of 'Z strongly corrects X within δ' from T . In particular, we first show that a computation of p starting from a state where T is true reaches a state where R is true within θ time units. Then, we show that starting from this state p refines 'Z strongly corrects X within δ'.
• For the first part, since p becomes p|R within θ from T , it follows that p reaches a state where R is true within θ.
• For the second part, we show that there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 such that starting from this state, p satisfies Safeness, Progress, Stability and Strong Convergence within δ. Since R ⇒ S is trivially true, Safeness is satisfied. In a state where R is true, Progress is satisfied. Since p refines p from R and R is closed in p , Stability is satisfied. Finally, since in a computation starting from a state where R is true, S is immediately true at all states and p is closed in S, by choosing δ = 0 Strong Convergence is satisfied.
We now use Claim 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 to show that if a nonmasking f -tolerant program p with recovery time θ is designed by reusing p then there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 such that p contains a nonmasking f -tolerant strong δ-corrector with recovery time θ for an invariant predicate of p. Proof. Let T 1 be the fault-span used to show that p is nonmasking fault-tolerant. Let T 2 = T 1 ∧ T . Since T 1 and T are
Now, we use the definition of Z and X given in the proof of Lemma 4.3 and show that there exists δ, θ ∈ Z ≥0 such that p is nonmasking f -tolerant with recovery time θ to 'Z strongly corrects X within δ' from R and the f -span of p is T 2 . To this end, we first show that there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 such that p refines 'Z strongly corrects X within δ' from R, and then show that p []f refines the nonmasking tolerance specification with recovery time θ of 'Z strongly corrects X within δ' from T 2 .
In Lemma 4.3, we have shown that there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 such that starting from any state in R, every computation of p satisfies Safeness, Progress, Stability, and Strong Convergence within δ. It follows that by choosing δ = 0, p refines 'Z strongly corrects X within δ' from R.
The proof of Lemma 4.3 can also be used to show that there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 such that p refines the nonmasking tolerance specification with recovery tine θ of 'Z strongly corrects X within δ' from T 2 . In the presence of f , this specification may be violated. However, by Assumption 2.14, after at most k faults occur, where k is the bound on the number faults that may occur in a computation, p reaches a state where R is true within at most k.θ time units (i.e., θ = k.θ). And, from this state, p refines 'Z strongly corrects X within δ(= 0)'. Thus, p is nonmasking f -tolerant with recovery time θ = |f s |.θ + f t to 'Z strongly corrects X within δ(= 0)' from R.
In the proof of Theorem 4.4, although we showed that the recovery time that a strong δ-corrector provides in worst case depends on the maximum number of occurrence of faults, one can design correctors with better recovery time. For instance, in [7] , the authors present automated methods to synthesize one type of such correctors using state exploration and Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm.
Remark. As mentioned earlier in this section, if we do not require bounded-time recovery for nonmasking programs, the results presented in this subsection reduce to the one given by Arora and Kulkarni [1] , in which nonmasking tolerant correctors are defined as strong ∞-correctors.
Example
Consider an alternating bit protocol where an infinite input array at a sender process is to be copied, one array item at a time, into an infinite output array at a receiver process. The sender and receiver communicate via a bidirectional channel that can hold at most one message in each direction at a time.
Fault-intolerant program. Iteratively, a simple loop is followed: sender s sends a copy of one array item to receiver r.
Upon receiving this item, r sends an acknowledgment to s, which enables the next array item to be sent by s and so on. Each iteration is supposed to take at most τ time units. The program maintains binary variables rs in s and rr in r; rs is 1 if s has received and acknowledgement for the last message it sent, and rr is 1 if r has received a message but has not sent an acknowledgement yet. Furthermore, the program maintains a timer x which is reset every time s sends a message. Also, s receives an acknowledgement if the timer is not expired. The 0 or 1 messages in transit from s to r are denoted by the sequence cs, and the 0 or 1 acknowledgments in transit from r to s are denoted by the sequence cr. Finally, the index in the input array corresponding to the item that s will send next is denoted by ns, and the index in the output array corresponding to the item that r last received is denoted by nr.
The intolerant program contains five actions, the first two in s and the next two in r. The last action is a guarded wait command, which models legitimate delays. The specification SPEC requires that each item is delivered to the receiver and the sender receives the corresponding acknowledgement within 3 time units. 
Fault Actions. In this example, the immediate fault actions cause loss of either a message or an acknowledgment. The delay faults expire the transmission timer and may advance it for at most 2 time units. The corresponding fault actions are as follows:
Nonmasking fault-tolerant program. In order to add nonmasking fault-tolerance with recovery time θ = 10, we design and add a strong δ-corrector CR with correction predicate X = S ID (i.e., the invariant of the intolerant program), witness predicate Z = S ID ∧ {σ | x(σ) = 0} (i.e., states of the invariant where x is reset), and δ = 13. Precisely, CR consists of two actions: (1) an action that retransmits the last sent item, and (2) a delay action that maintains the required recovery time θ.
Thus, the actions of the corrector CR are as follows:
Thus, the nonmasking program consists of seven actions; five actions are identical to the actions of program ID, the rest are the actions of the corrector CR identified above.
The Role of Detectors and Week δ-Correctors in Hard-Failsafe Fault-Tolerance
In this Subsection, we present a more rigorous theory of detectors than the one presented in [1] and develop the theory weak δ-correctors. Intuitively, in this subsection, our goal is to show that if a program is hard-failsafe f -tolerant then it contains hard-failsafe tolerant detectors and weak δ-correctors. We present this result in Theorem 4.13.
Our proof is organized as follows: first, Lemma 4.6 shows that the violation of the untimed part of the safety specification can be detected from the current state, independent of how that state is reached. Subsequently, Lemma 4.7 shows that there exists a set of states from where execution of the program maintains the given safety specification. Next, using lemmas 4.6 and 4.7, in Lemma 4.9, we show that for any program p, there exists a unique weakest detection predicate. Then, in Claim 4.12,
we prove that if a program refines a safety specification then it contains detectors and weak δ-correctors. Finally, in Theorem 4.13, we show that hard-failsafe programs contain hard-failsafe tolerant detectors and weak δ-correctors.
Throughout this section, let p be a program, SPEC be a specification, SSPEC bt and SSPEC br be the minimal safety specifications that contains SPEC bt and SPEC br respectively, α be a prefix of a computation, β be a finite suffix of a computation, σ and σ be states, and X be a state predicate.
Assumption 4.5
Without loss of generality, for simplicity, we assume that transitions that correspond to different actions of the program (except guarded wait commands) are mutually disjoint, i.e., they do not contain overlapping transitions. The results int this paper are valid without this assumption in the sense that we can easily modify the given program to one that satisfies this assumption. Moreover, we assume that program computations are fair in the sense that in every computation, if the guard of an action is continuously true then that action is eventually chosen for execution.
Recall that in order to show the existence of the correctors in Subsection 4.1, we proved that the fault-tolerant program contains a corrector for an invariant predicate of the fault-intolerant program. For existence of detectors, we would like to
show that the fault-tolerant program contains a detector for a detection predicate associated with the fault-intolerant program.
However, unlike the invariant predicate, we need to identify additional syntactic characteristics of program before detection predicates can be identified. With this intuition, we now characterize programs syntactically. First, we reiterate two lemmas from [1] . Note that in Lemma 4.6, since the transitions in SPEC bt occur instantaneously, we ignore the global time of states. for the precise definition.) In other words, p has an action corresponding to each action of p. To show that p is using a detector for an action of p, we require that the witness predicate of that detector be g ∧ g which is the guard of the corresponding action in p .
Lemma 4.6 (Arora and Kulkarni [1])
Based on the above discussion, given a timed guarded command of the form g λ − → st of p, its (weakest) detection predicate sf and the corresponding action g ∧ g λ||λ − −− → st||st of p , we require that the detection predicate of the desired detector be g ∧ sf and the witness predicate of the desired detector be g ∧ g . With this intuition, we next define what we mean by a program reusing another program.
Definition 4.11 (reuses)
We say that p reuses p from S iff the following two conditions are satisfied:
• p encapsulates p from S.
Based on Definitions 4.10 and 4.11, and applying the concept of weak δ-correctors, we are now ready to show that if a program refines a safety specification SPEC bt ∩ SPEC br then it contains detectors and weak δ-correctors. The intuition is that if program p is designed by transforming p so as to satisfy SSPEC bt (respectively, SSPEC br ), then the transformation must have added a detector (respectively, a weak δ-corrector) for p, and p reuses p. We formulate this in Claim 4.12.
Claim 4.12 Programs that refine a safety specification contain detectors and weak δ-correctors. That is, if
• p reuses p from S, and
• (∀ac | ac is an action of p : p contains a detector of a detection predicate of ac), and
there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 such that p contains a weak δ-corrector for the response predicate of the stable bounded response property P i → ≤δi Q i of SPEC br ).
Proof. We distinguish two cases based on refinement of SPEC bt and SPEC br :
1. (existence of detectors) Let ac be an action of p. We show that p contains a detector of a detection predicate of ac. Let sf be the weakest detection predicate for ac. Since p reuses p from S, if ac is of the form g Let Z = g ∧ g , and
Since X ⇒ sf , whenever X is true, execution of ac maintains SSPEC bt . It follows that X is a detection predicate of ac. We now show that p refines 'Z detects X' from S.
• By definition of Z, Z ⇒ g. Since p refines SSPEC bt from S, whenever ac is executed in a state where S is true, its execution is safe. Since sf is the weakest detection predicate of ac, S ∧ Z ⇒ sf . Thus, Safeness is satisfied.
• Consider any computation, say σ , of p which starts in a state where S is true and X is true in each state in σ .
By definition of X, g is true in each state in σ . Now, consider the computation, say σ, obtained by projecting σ on p. Since p refines p from S, σ is a computation of p. In σ, g is continuously true. Therefore, by fairness (cf.
Assumption 4.5), action ac must eventually be executed. Let σ denote the state where action ac executes in σ, and let σ denote the corresponding state in σ . Consider the action ac executed by p in state σ . Since we assume that the transitions included in different guarded commands are mutually exclusive, ac is the only action that can be executed at σ . In other words, no other action in p has the same effect on variables of p from state σ. Thus, Z is true in state σ and, hence, Progress is satisfied.
• If Stability does not hold, it implies that even if X is continuously true, the computation does not have a suffix where Z is not continuously true. If Stability does not hold then there exists a computation of p where the action ac is never executed. Now, consider this computation of p and its projection on p. In the projected computation, g is continuously true. However, action ac is not executed. And, this is a contradiction since p reuses p from S.
2. (existence of weak δ-correctors) As mentioned in Section 2, SPEC br is a conjunction of m ∈ Z ≥0 stable bounded response properties. We show that for each such property of the form P i → ≤δi Q i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, p contains a weak δ-corrector.
Let X = Q i , and Z = Q i ∧ {σ | σ is a state of p such that σ is reached in some computation of p starting from P i ∧ S}. Now, we show that there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 such that p refines 'Z weakly corrects X within δ' from S:
• By definition of Z, in any state where Z is true, Q i is true. Thus, Safeness is satisfied.
• Since p refines P i → ≤δi Q i from S every computation of p starting from S ∧ P i will reach a state where S ∧ Q i is true within δ i . By definition of Z, Z is true in this state as well. Thus, Progress is satisfied.
• By the same token and choosing δ = δ i , Weak Convergence within δ is satisfied.
• Since p refines p from S, it follows that S is closed in p . Obviously, the second conjunct in Z is closed in p as well. Thus, Z is closed in p and, hence, Stability is satisfied.
We now use Claim 4.12 to show that if a hard-failsafe f -tolerant program p is designed by reusing p then p contains a hard-failsafe tolerant detector for each action of p and a hard-failsafe tolerant weak δ-corrector for each stable bounded response property. Let Z = g ∧ g , and let
Since X ⇒ sf , whenever X is true, execution of ac maintains SPEC bt . It follows that X is a detection predicate of ac. We now show that p is hard-failsafe f -tolerant for 'Z detects X' from R. To this end, we first show that p refines 'Z detects X' from R. Then, we show that there exists an f -span T such that p []f refines the hard-failsafe tolerance specification of 'Z detects X' from T :
• For the first part, since R ⇒ S, we observe that p refines SSPEC bt from R. Therefore, as in Claim 4.12, it follows that p refines 'Z detects X' from R.
• For the second part, we let T be the f -span used to show that p is hard-failsafe f -tolerant for SPEC bt from R. In this part, we need to show that a computation of p []f satisfies Safeness and Stability. This proof is identical to the first part of proof of Safeness and Stability in Claim 4.12.
2. (existence of hard-failsafe tolerant weak δ-correctors) We show that for each stable bounded response property of the form P i → ≤δi Q i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 such that p contains a hard-failsafe tolerant weak δ-corrector
Let X = Q i , and Z = Q i ∧ {σ | σ is a state of p such that σ is reached in some computation of p starting from P i }.
Now, we show that there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 such that p is hard-failsafe f -tolerant for 'Z weakly corrects X within δ'. To this end, we first show that p refines 'Z weakly corrects X within δ' from R. Then, we show that there exists an f -span T such that p []f refines the hard-failsafe tolerance specification of 'Z weakly corrects X within δ' from T :
• For the first part, since R ⇒ S, we observe that p refines SSPEC br from R. Therefore, as in Claim 4.12, it follows that there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 (namely δ = δ i ) such that p refines 'Z weakly corrects X within δ' from R.
• For the second part, we let T be the f -span used to show that p is hard-failsafe f -tolerant for SPEC br from R.
In this part, we need to show that a computation of p []f satisfies Safeness, Stability, and Weak Convergence. The proof of Safeness and Stability is identical to the second part of proof of Claim 4.12. In order to show that a computation of p []f satisfies Weak Convergence, first, recall that by Assumption 2.14, at most k faults may occur.
Hence, p reaches a state where Q i is true within at most k.δ i time units. Thus, by choosing δ = |f s |.
is hard-failsafe f -tolerant to 'Z weakly corrects X within δ' from R.
Example
We now illustrate an instance of detectors and weak δ-correctors in hard-failsafe programs using an altitude switch example from [8] . The altitude switch program (ASW) reads a set of input variables coming from an altitude meter. Then, it powers on a Device of Interest (DOI) when the aircraft descends below a pre-specified altitude threshold. There exist six internal variables, a mode variable that determines the operating mode of the program, three watchdog timers, and an input variable that represents the state of the altitude meter:
• The internal variables are as follows: (i) mAltBelow is equal to 1 if the altitude is below a pre-specific threshold, otherwise, it is equal to 0; (ii) mDOIStatus is equal to 1 if the DOI is powered on, otherwise, it is equal to 0; (iii) mInit is equal to 1 when the system is being initialized; otherwise, it is equal to 0; (iv) mInhibit is equal to 1 when the DOI power-on is inhibited; otherwise, it is equal to 0, (v) mReset is equal to 0 if a system reset has been initiated. Otherwise, it is equal to 1, and (vi) iCorruptSensor is equal to 1 if the system reads an invalid value from the altitude meter sensors.
Otherwise, it is equal to 0.
• The ASW program can be in three different modes: (i) initialization mode when the system is initializing; (ii) await mode when the system is waiting for the DOI to power on, and (iii) standby mode. We use the variable mcStatus with domain {INIT, AWAIT, STANDBY} to show the system modes in the program.
• We model the signals that come from the altitude meter by the variable iSensorReading. This variable is equal to ⊥ when the system fails to read the altitude meter. Otherwise, it is not equal to ⊥.
• We introduce three watchdog timers: (i) the clock variable x measures the time elapsed since the system has been in the INIT mode; (ii) the clock variable y measures the time elapsed since the system has failed to read the altitude meter (i.e., iCorruptSensor = 1), and (iii) the clock variable z measures the time elapsed since the system has been in the AWAIT mode. The invariant of the ASW program consists of the following states:
The safety specification requires that the program does not change its mode from STANDBY to AWAIT, if it fails to read the altitude meter. Also, when the state of the program is perturbed, it can only go to the INIT mode. Furthermore, the safety specification has three bounded response properties that specifies the timing constraints of the altitude switch. Formally, the safety specification is as follows:
Fault actions. The ASW program is subject to a set of delay faults when the program is (i) initializing; (ii) in a state where altitude meter shows invalid values, or (iii) is waiting for the DOI to power on. Moreover, faults can corrupt the reading of the altitude meter as well. Observe that in the intolerant program, action ASW3 does not maintain the safety specification when the altitude meter shows invalid value (i.e., fault F 4 occurs).
To preserve the safety specification, we will use a detector DR. It is easy to see that in DR the detection predicate X = (mcStatus = STANDBY) ∧ (iCorruptSensor = 1) and the witness predicate Z = Guard (ASW3) ∧ (iCorruptSensor = 1).
Thus, to add hard-failsafe fault-tolerance, ASW3 is restricted to execute only when the witness predicate of DR is true. Thus, Moreover, we require that if the program fails to read the altitude meter, it should initialize in at most 2 seconds even in the presence of the delay fault F 2 :: (mcStatus = STANDBY) ∧ (iCorruptSensor = 1) ∧ (2 ≤ y ≤ 3) → wait. To preserve this property, we will use a weak δ-corrector. In particular, actions ASW6 and ASW9 can potentially be such a corrector. Thus, it suffices to strengthen action ASW6 to get a weak 1-corrector that tolerates F 2 by allowing delay transitions only for at most 1 second when the program is in the STANDBY mode and the altitude meter reads a corrupted value:
Observe that Actions ASW6 and ASW9 in the intolerant program already provide the required computations to meet the deadline of reaching the STANDBY mode in the fault-span. Thus, in the design of the weak δ-corrector, we did not add any "recovery" computations to the tolerant program. In fact, in order to design the weak δ-corrector, we removed the computations that do not meet the deadline in the presence of faults by strengthening the Action ASW6.
The Role of Real-Time Fault-Tolerance Components in Soft and Hard-Masking Programs
In this subsection, we present the theory of necessity of real-time fault-tolerance components in masking tolerant programs.
We distinguish three levels of masking fault-tolerance, namely, (1) soft-masking with bounded-time recovery, (2) hard-masking with bounded-time recovery, and (3) hard-masking with unbounded-time recovery. Recall that necessity of existence of components in soft-masking tolerance with unbounded-time recovery has been shown in [1] . For reasons space and similarity of proofs to previous sections, in this subsection, we only outline the main theorems and we refer the reader to http://www.cse.msu.edu/˜borzoo/proofs.pdf for the detailed proofs.
Soft-masking with bounded-time recovery. Since a soft-masking program must maintain SPEC bt in the presence of faults and it guarantees bounded-time recovery, we can decompose it into a fault-intolerant program, detectors to refine SPEC bt , and strong δ-correctors to provide bounded-time recovery.
Theorem 4.14 Soft-masking f -tolerant programs with recovery time θ contain softmasking tolerant detectors and strong δ-correctors. That is, if
• p reuses p from R, where R ⇒ S,
• p refines SPEC bt≤θ p|R from T , where T ⇐ R, and
• p is soft-masking f -tolerant to SPEC from T , then
• (∀ ac | ac is an action of p : p is a soft-masking f -tolerant detector of a detection predicate of ac),
• there exists δ such that p is a soft-masking tolerant strong δ-corrector of an invariant predicate of p, and
• p is a nonmasking f -tolerant δ-corrector with recovery time θ of an invariant predicate of p for some θ .
Hard-masking with bounded-time recovery. Since a hard-masking program must maintain both SPEC bt and SPEC br in the presence of faults and it guarantees bounded-time recovery, we can decompose it into a fault-intolerant program, detectors for refining SPEC bt , weak δ-correctors for refining SPEC br and strong δ-correctors to provide bounded-time recovery. for the response predicate of stable bounded response property P i → ≤δi Q i of SPEC br ),
• there exists δ such that p is a hard-masking tolerant strong δ -corrector of an invariant predicate of p, and
• p is a nonmasking f -tolerant δ -corrector with recovery time θ of an invariant predicate of p for some θ .
Observe that in case of unbounded-time soft-masking (respectively, hard-masking) programs, in Theorem 4.14 (respectively, Theorem 4.15), we only need to replace the strong δ-correctors (respectively, strong δ -correctors) by strong ∞-correctors. The rest of the statement of both theorems and proofs remain unchanged.
Example
We now illustrate the role of strong δ-correctors in hard-masking fault-tolerance in the ASW program presented in Subsection 4.2.1. More specifically, we enhance fault-tolerance level of ASW from hard-failsafe to hard-masking with recovery time θ = 1.
Using the hard-failsafe program in Subsection 4.2.1, it only remains to add a strong δ-corrector that provides recovery to the invariant. Notice that according to SPEC bt of ASW, recovery is only possible to the states where the program is in the INIT mode, which (similar to the alternating bit protocol) in turn identifies the witness predicate. Thus, the actions of the strong δ-corrector is as follows: In this paper, we focused on a theory of fault-tolerance components in the context real-time programs. We showed that these components, namely, detectors and weak/strong δ-correctors, are integral parts of fault-tolerant real-time programs that reuse their fault-intolerant version. In particular, we showed that depending upon the level of fault-tolerance, namely soft-failsafe, hard-failsafe, nonmasking, soft-masking, and hard-masking, the fault-tolerant real-time program contains one or more of such components.
We note that the use of detectors and correctors from [1] in untimed programs has been illustrated in terms of several examples such as repetitive Byzantine agreement, mutual exclusion, tree maintenance, leader election, termination detection, bounded network management, etc. We are currently investigating the use of detectors and weak/strong δ-correctors for developing design methods for fault-tolerant real-time programs.
We are also focusing on using these components in the context of automated addition of fault-tolerance. In particular, by designing and verifying these components in advance, it would be possible to speed up automated addition of fault-tolerance to real-time programs. Towards this end, we are working on extending our current work on automated addition of fault-tolerance (cf. http://www.cse.msu.edu/˜sandeep/publications) to use detectors and weak/strong δ-correctors.
